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Abstract
Many problems in machine learning and game
theory can be formulated as saddle-point prob-
lems, for which various first-order methods have
been developed and proven efficient in practice.
Under the general convex-concave assumption,
most first-order methods only guarantee ergodic
convergence, that is, convergence of the uniform
averages of the iterates. However, numerically,
the iterates themselves can sometimes converge
much faster than the uniform averages. This ob-
servation motivates increasing averaging schemes
that put more weight on later iterates, in con-
trast to the usual uniform averaging. We show
that such increasing averaging schemes, applied
to various first-order methods, are able to pre-
serve the convergence of the averaged iterates
with no additional assumptions or computational
overhead. Extensive numerical experiments on
various equilibrium computation and image de-
noising problems demonstrate the effectiveness of
the increasing averaging schemes. In particular,
the increasing averages consistently outperform
the uniform averages in all test problems by or-
ders of magnitude. When solving matrix games
and extensive-form games, increasing averages
consistently outperform the last iterate as well.
For matrix games, a first-order method equipped
with increasing averaging outperforms the highly
competitive CFR+ algorithm.
1. Introduction
Consider saddle point problems of the form
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
L(x, y) (1)
where L is a general convex-concave function and X, Y
are Euclidean spaces. For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y, denote its
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saddle-point residual as
sad(x, y) = max
y′∈Y
L(x, y′)− min
x′∈X
L(x′, y).
Many problems in machine learning and game theory can
be modeled as (1). For example, various regularized finite-
sum loss minimization problems, imaging models, and two-
player zero-sum games have natural saddle-point formu-
lations (Chambolle & Pock, 2011; Kroer et al., 2018b).
First-order methods are naturally suitable for these prob-
lems and have been proven efficient in practice. For ex-
ample, Chambolle & Pock (2011) gives an algorithm for
solving saddle-point problems involving bilinear and sepa-
rable, nonsmooth terms and demonstrate its effectiveness in
imaging applications. Kroer et al. (2018a) uses the Exces-
sive Gap Technique (EGT) (Nesterov, 2005), with a specific
distance-generating function, to solve saddle-point formu-
lation of zero-sum extensive-form games (EFG). Given the
general convex-concave structure without strong convexity
and smoothness assumptions, these algorithms only guaran-
tee ergodic convergence, that is, the saddle-point residual of
the uniform average of all iterates up to time T is of order
O(1/T ). Meanwhile, numerically, the iterates themselves
(commonly referred to as “last iterates”) often converge
much more rapidly than the simple uniform averages: see,
for example, Chambolle & Pock (2016). This observation
motivates new averaging schemes that put more weight on
later iterates rather than uniformly across all of them. Let
(xt, yt), t = 1, 2, . . . denote the iterates generated by a first-
order method.1 Let wt be positive, nondecreasing weights
and denote ST =
∑T
t=1 wt. We consider averages of the
form
x¯T =
1
ST
T∑
t=1
wtx
t, y¯T =
1
ST
T∑
t=1
wty
t. (2)
For example, wt = 1 results in uniform averages; wt =
t, t2, and t3 result in linear, quadratic and cubic averages,
respectively. We refer to such choices of positive, nonde-
creasing wt as increasing iterate averaging schemes (IIAS)
and the resulting x¯T , y¯T with IIAS collectively as increas-
ing averages. In fact, in solving extensive-form games, the
1These are the iterates used in forming the uniform averages(
1
T
∑T
t=1 x
t, 1
T
∑T
t=1 y
t
)
which converge at a rate of O(1/T )
in terms of the saddle-point residual; for some algorithms, they are
not necessarily denoted as (xt, yt). See, for example, Theorem 2.
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highly successful CFR+ algorithm uses a form of linear
averaging (Tammelin et al., 2015). Similar averaging tech-
niques have also been used in other algorithms for solving
large-scale sequential games that achieve superhuman per-
formance in poker (Bowling et al., 2015; Moravcˇík et al.,
2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2018).
We show that for a large class of first-order algorithms,
IIAS produces averages with the same convergence prop-
erty as the original uniform averages. Algorithms com-
patible with IIAS include the (vanilla) primal-dual algo-
rithm (PDA) (Chambolle & Pock, 2011), its relaxed version
(RPDA), inertial version (IPDA) (Chambolle & Pock, 2016),
and linesearch version (PDAL) (Malitsky & Pock, 2018),
as well as Mirror Descent (MD) (Nemirovski & Yudin,
1983; Beck & Teboulle, 2003; Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2019)
and Mirror Prox (MP) (Nemirovski, 2004; Ben-Tal & Ne-
mirovski, 2019). For most of the algorithms, in order to
preserve the convergence of (x¯T , y¯T ), it suffices to choose
wt = t
q for some weight exponent q ≥ 0, completely in-
dependent of the problem instance and the algorithm. For
algorithms with linesearch or inertial components, in or-
der to ensure theoretical convergence, wt needs to satisfy
additional inequalities arising from convergence analysis.
This makes wt depend on wt−1, and possibly also on a
few running hyperparameters such as stepsizes of current
and previous iterations, which can all be easily satisfied by
simple recursive formula for wt (see Theorem 3 and 4).
We emphasize that for any first-order method, an increasing
iterate averaging scheme does not alter the execution of
the original algorithm. In other words, the performance
boost is achieved without any extra computation or memory
requirement - we simply replace the uniform averages by
increasingly weighted ones; the averaging weights wt, the
sum of weights
∑T
t=1 wt and the averages (x¯
T , y¯T ) can
all be updated iteratively and incrementally along with the
execution of the algorithm.
Summary of contributions First, we provide simple IIAS
for a variety of first-order methods and establish the con-
vergence properties for their respective weighted iterate
averages. The high-level idea of the analysis can be sum-
marized as follows. For each of the first-order methods, in
the proof of the O(1/T ) rate of convergence, we identify
the critical inequality that is summed across all time steps
to derive the final rate. Instead of performing that summa-
tion, we take a weighted sum where the weights are wt.
Then, through telescoping the summation, we bound the
right hand side by O
(
wT∑T
t=1 wt
)
. This is of order O(1/T )
as long as wt grows polynomially, that is, wt > 0, nonde-
creasing, and wt+1wt ≤
(t+1)q
tq for all t, for some q ≥ 0. For
PDA, RPDA and MP, it suffices to choose wt = tq, while
for other algorithms wt needs to satisfy simple additional
inequalities, which are required for the telescoping summa-
tion. Second, we perform extensive numerical experiments
on various first-order methods and saddle-point point prob-
lems to demonstrate the consistent, strong performance gain
of IIAS. Test problems include matrix games of different
sizes and generative distributions, extensive-form games,
Fisher market equilibirum computation and the TV-`1 im-
age denoising model. As the results demonstrate, increasing
averages consistently outperform uniform averages in all
algorithm-problem pairs by orders of magnitude. When
solving matrix games and extensive-form games, increasing
averages consistently outperforms the last iterate as well.
When solving matrix games, PDA and RPDA equipped with
IIAS also outperforms the highly competitive CFR+ algo-
rithm. For EFGs, RPDA under static, theoretically safe
hyperparameters equipped with quadratic averaging outper-
forms EGT with unsafe, sophisticated, adaptive stepsizing.
Organization Section 2 presents the increasing averag-
ing generalization of the primal-dual algorithm (PDA) of
(Chambolle & Pock, 2016) and its analysis in detail. Section
3 presents similar generalizations for the relaxed, inertial
and linesearch variants of PDA. Section 4 discusses similar
generalizations for Mirror Prox and Mirror Descent. Section
5 presents numerical experiment setups and results.
2. The primal-dual algorithm
Problem setup and notation In this section, we follow
the setup in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016). Let X and Y be
real reflexive Banach spaces (for every algorithm except
PDA, these must be Euclidean spaces) with norms ‖ · ‖X
and ‖ · ‖Y, respectively. Denote the dual space of X as
X∗. Its corresponding dual norm, for any x∗ ∈ X∗, is
defined as ‖x∗‖X,∗ = sup‖x‖=1〈x∗, x〉. Define Y∗ and
‖y∗‖Y,∗ similarly. The subscripts on the norms are dropped
when there is no ambiguity. Let K : X → Y∗ be a
bounded linear operator. and K∗ : Y → X∗ be its ad-
joint operator. The (operator) norm of K is defined as
‖K‖ = sup‖x‖≤1, ‖y‖≤1〈Kx, y〉. Let ψX and ψY be 1-
strongly convex (w.r.t. to their respective norms) smooth
functions (known as distance-generating functions or DGF).
Let DX and DY be their respective Bregman divergence
functions, that is, for V = X,Y, v, v′ ∈ V,
DV(v
′, v) := ψV(v′)− ψV(v)− 〈∇ψV(v), v′ − v〉. (3)
Let f be a proper lower-semicontinuous (l.s.c.) con-
vex function whose gradient ∇f is Lf -Lipschitz con-
tinuous on X. Let g, h be simple proper l.s.c. con-
vex functions, that is, for τ, σ > 0, the proximal
maps Proxτg(x) = arg minu {τg(u) +DX(x, u)} and
Proxσh∗(y) = arg minv {σh∗(v) +DY(y, v)} can be com-
puted efficiently. In addition, assume dom g ⊆ domψX
and domh∗ ⊆ domψY. For τ, σ > 0, define the ma-
trix Mτ,σ =
[
1
τ I −K∗−K 1σ I
]
. Clearly, it is positive definite
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Algorithm 1 Nonlinear primal-dual algorithm (PDA)
Input: Initial iterate (x0, y0) ∈ X×Y, stepsizes τ, σ > 0,
Bregman divergence functions DX and DY.
Iterations: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , compute
(xt+1, yt+1) = PDτ,σ(x
t, yt, 2xt+1 − xt, yt).
(semidefinite) as long as τσL2 < 1 (≤ 1).
With the above setup, consider the convex-concave saddle-
point problem
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
L(x, y) := 〈Kx, y〉+ f(x) + g(x)− h∗(y).
(4)
For τ, σ > 0 and (x¯, y¯) ∈ X × Y, (x˜, y˜) ∈ X × Y, define
the generic operator (xˆ, yˆ) = PDτ,σ(x¯, y¯, x˜, y˜) as follows:
xˆ = arg min
x
{
f(x¯) + 〈∇f(x¯), x− x¯〉+ g(x)
+〈Kx, y˜〉+ 1τDX(x, x¯)
}
,
yˆ = arg min
y
{
h∗(y)− 〈Kx˜, y〉+ 1
σ
DY(y, y¯)
}
.
Note that the update is asymmetric: if an algorithm uses
PD to generate iterates (xt, yt), then yt+1 may depend on
xt+1, which then depends on (xt, yt).
Chambolle & Pock (2016) proposes a primal-dual algorithm
(PDA), which is listed here as Algorithm PDA. Theorem
1 in their paper shows that the averages x¯T := 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t
and y¯T := 1T
∑T
t=1 y
t converge at a rate of O(1/T ). The
key to the proof is Lemma 1 in their work, which we restated
below.
Lemma 1. Assume (xˆ, yˆ) = PDτ,σ(x¯, y¯, x˜, y˜) for some
τ, σ > 0. Then, for any (x, y) ∈ X× Y, one has
L(xˆ, y)− L(x, yˆ)
≤ 1
τ
(DX(x, x¯)−DX(x, xˆ)−DX(xˆ, x¯)) + Lf
2
‖xˆ− x¯‖2
+
1
σ
(DY(y, y¯)−DY(y, y˜)−DY(yˆ, y¯))
+ 〈K(x− xˆ), y˜ − yˆ〉 − 〈K(x˜− xˆ), y − yˆ〉. (5)
Based on Lemma 1, we obtain the following extension of
Theorem 1 in Chambolle & Pock (2016) that incorporates
IIAS.
Theorem 1. For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , let wt = tq for some q ≥
0. Let (xt, yt), t = 1, 2, . . . be generated by PDA, where
the stepsizes τ, σ are chosen such that, for all x, x′ ∈ dom g
and y, y′ ∈ domh∗, it holds that(
1
τ
− Lf
)
DX(x, x
′) +
1
σ
DY(y, y
′)
−〈K(x− x′), y − y′〉 ≥ 0. (6)
Let ST =
∑T
t=1 wt. Let x¯
T , y¯T be as in (2). Let ΩX and ΩY
be upper bounds on DX(x, xt) and DY(y, yt), respectively.
Let Ω := ΩXτ +
ΩY
σ + ‖K‖. Then, for any T ≥ 1 and
(x, y) ∈ X× Y, one has
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤ (q + 1)Ω
T
. (7)
Proof. For any x, x′ ∈ dom g and y, y′ ∈ domh∗, de-
note A(x, y, x′, y′) = 1τDX(x, x
′)+ 1σDY(y, y
′)−〈K(x−
x′), y − y′〉. Equation (6) and the boundedness assump-
tions on the Bregman distances imply that, for any (x, x′) ∈
dom g and y, y′ ∈ domh∗, 0 ≤ A(x, y, x′, y′) ≤ Ω. As
in the proof of Theorem 1 in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016),
Lemma 1 and PDA imply the following critical inequality:
L(xt+1, y)− L(x, yt+1)
≤ A(x, y, xt, yt)−A(x, y, xt+1, yt+1)
−
(
A(xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt)− Lf
2
‖xt+1 − xt‖2
)
≤ A(x, y, xt, yt)−A(x, y, xt+1, yt+1) (8)
where the last inequality is due to (6). Multiplying (8) by
wt+1 and summing up over t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 yield
T∑
t=1
wt
(L(xt, y)− L(x, yt))
≤
T∑
t=1
wt
(
A(x, y, xt−1, yt−1)−A(x, y, xt, yt))
≤
T∑
t=1
(wt − wt−1)A(x, y, xt−1, yt−1) ≤ ΩwT . (9)
Meanwhile, the convex-concave structure of L, that is, con-
vexity of (u, v) 7→ L(u, y)− L(x, v), implies
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤ 1
ST
T∑
t=1
wt
(L(xt, y)− L(x, yt)) .
(10)
Note that ST ≥
∫ T
0
xq dx = T
q+1
q+1 , which, together with (9)
and (10), implies (7).
The key proof idea is to take the weighted sum of the crit-
ical inequalities at all t and bound the right hand side via
telescoping summation. In fact, this technique recurs in sub-
sequent analysis of IIAS for other algorithms. We remark
that the existence of the upper bounds ΩX and ΩY does hold
in many realistic scenarios. For example, in the case of
two-person zero-sum games with Euclidean DGF, g and h∗
are indicator functions of the strategy spaces X , Y , which
are bounded polytopes with small diameters.
Increasing Iterate Averaging for Solving Saddle-Point Problems
As a side note, Theorem 1 and subsequent theorems
present point-wise inequalities, that is, a uniform bound on
L(x¯T , y)−L(x, y¯T ) independent of (x, y). A bound on the
saddle-point residual sad(x¯T , y¯T ) can be easily obtained
by taking minx∈X maxy∈Y on both sides.
3. Extensions of PDA
We analyze similar increasing averaging schemes applied
to the relaxed, inertial versions of PDA, as described in
(Chambolle & Pock, 2016), and a nontrivial extension with
linesearch (PDAL) proposed in (Malitsky & Pock, 2018).
We use the same notation and setup as those in Section 2. In
addition, we assume ‖·‖X, ‖·‖Y are 2-norms with respect to
their inner products and the Bregman divergences are given
by Euclidean DGF, that is, DX(x, x′) = 12‖x − x′‖22 and
DY(y, y′) = 12‖y − y′‖22.
Relaxed primal dual algorithm The relaxed primal-dual
algorithm (RPDA) in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016) is listed
here as Algorithm 2. We show that a similar generalization
for increasing averaging can be obtained.
Theorem 2. Let the stepsizes τ, σ > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 2)
satisfy2 (
1
τ
− Lf
2− ρ
)
1
σ
≥ ‖K‖22.
Let {ρt} be nondecreasing and ρt ≤ 2 for all t. Let (ξt, ηt),
t = 1, 2, . . . be generated by RPDA. Let ST =
∑T
t=1 wt,
x¯T = 1ST
∑T
t=1 wtξ
t and y¯T = 1ST
∑T
t=1 wtη
t. Then, for
any z = (x, y) ∈ X× Y, one has
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤ Ω
ρ0T
, (11)
where Ω is as in Theorem 1.
Note that here the increasing averages are still of the form
(2) but with xt, yt replaced by ξt, ηt, since the latter are the
iterates satisfying the critical inequalities and being aver-
aged in the uniform averages of the original algorithm. The
proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and can be found in
Appendix A.1.
Inertial primal-dual algorithm Another useful variant of
PDA is the inertial primal-dual algorithm (IPDA) (Cham-
bolle & Pock, 2016), listed here as Algorithm 3. For PDA
and RPDA, the weights wt in IIAS can be chosen inde-
pendent of the algorithms’ hyperparameters. In the case
of IPDA, in order to preserve the rate of convergence, wt
needs to satisfy a few additional inequalities, which arise
from analyzing the telescoping sum bound. They do not
2Theorem 2 in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016) requires strict in-
equality. Based on the proof, a nonstrict one suffices. The same is
true for Theorem 3.
Algorithm 2 Relaxed primal-dual algorithm (RPDA)
Input: Initial iterate z0 = (x0, y0) ∈ X × Y, stepsizes
τ, σ > 0, relaxation parameters ρt, t ≥ 0.
Set: DX(x, x′) = 12‖x − x′‖22 and DY(y, y′) = 12‖y −
y′‖22.
Denote zt = (xt, yt) and ζt = (ξt, ηt).
Iterations: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , compute{
(ξt+1, ηt+1) = PDτ,σ(x
t, yt, 2ξt+1 − xt, yt)
zt+1 = (1− ρn)zt + ρnζt+1
Algorithm 3 Inertial primal-dual algorithm (IPDA)
Input: initial iterates (x−1, y−1) = (x0, y0) ∈ X × Y,
stepsizes τ, σ > 0, inertial parameters αt, t ≥ 0.
Set: DX(x, x′) = 12‖x − x′‖22 and DY(y, y′) = 12‖y −
y′‖22.
Denote zt = (xt, yt) and ζt = (ξt, ηt).
Iterations: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , compute{
ζt = zt + αt(z
t − zt−1)
zt+1 = PDτ,σ(ξ
t, ηt, 2xt+1 − ξt, ηt).
affect the asymptotic rate of convergence, nor are they nec-
essary for numerical speedup, as our experiments show. The
choice of wt and the convergence guarantee are summarized
below. The proof is based on the same principles but is more
involved; it can be found in Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3. Let α > 0 be such that(
1
τ
− (1 + α)
2
1− 3α Lf
)
1
σ
≥ ‖K‖22. (12)
Furthermore, assume αt is nondecreasing and 0 ≤ αt ≤
α < 13 . Let (x
t, yt) be generated by IPDA. Letwt be chosen
as follows:{
w0 = 0, w1 = 1,
wt+1 ·min
{
bt,
(t+1)q
tq
}
, t ≥ 2 (13)
where
bt = min
{
1− αt−1
αt
,
r(1− αt−1)− (1 + αt−1)
αt(1 + 2r + αt)
}
and r =
1
τ−σ‖K‖2
Lf
. Then, it holds that wt ≤ wt+1 for all t.
Furthermore, let x¯T , y¯T be as in (2). For any (x, y) ∈ X×Y,
one has
L(x, y¯T )− L(x¯T , y)
≤ (1− α0)w1A0 + Ω [(1− αT−1)wT + α1w2 − w1]
ST
,
(14)
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Algorithm 4 PDAL: Primal-dual algorithm with linesearch
Input: initial iterates (x0, y0) ∈ X× Y, initial stepsize
τ0 > 0, backtracking discount factor µ, backtracking
break tolerance δ, primal-dual ratio β > 0.
Set: stepsize growth factor θ0 = 1, DX(x, x′) = 12‖x−
x′‖22 and DY = 12‖x− x′‖22.
Iterations: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , compute
xt+1 = Proxτtg(x
t − τtK∗yt).
(a) Choose τt+1 ∈ [τt, τt
√
1 + θt] and perform line-
search: compute θt+1 =
τt+1
τt
, x˜t+1 = xt+1 +
θt+1(x
t+1 − xt) and
yt+1 = Proxβτt+1h∗(y
t + βτt+1Kx˜
t+1).
(b) Break linesearch if√
βτt+1‖K∗yt+1 −K∗yt‖ ≤ δ‖yt+1 − yt‖.
Otherwise, set τt+1 ← τt+1µ and go to (a).
where A0 := ‖z − z0‖2Mτ,σ and Ω is as in Theorem 1.
Note that for problems with f = 0, Lf can be arbitrarily
small, which implies bt =
1−αt−1
2αt
≥ 1−α2α > 1 (since
α < 1/3). Therefore, by the recursive formula (13), wt
eventually grows polynomially. A corollary on the (non-
asymptotic) rate of convergence follows. The proof is in
Appendix A.3.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, for any
T ≥ 1 and any (x, y) ∈ X× Y, one has
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤ (q + 1)(2− α0)Ω
T
.
Primal-dual algorithm with linesearch Recently, (Malit-
sky & Pock, 2018) proposed a primal-dual algorithm with
linesearch (PDAL).3 Their analysis of PDAL requires Eu-
clidean norms and Bregman divergence functions, that is,
the same assumptions on ‖ · ‖X, ‖ · ‖Y, DX and DY as in
the analysis of RPDA and IPDA (Theorem 2 and 3). Note
that in PDAL, they assume the special case of f = 0 of the
general saddle point setup (4). Theorem 3.5 in (Malitsky &
Pock, 2018) establishes the ergodic convergence of PDAL.
We show the following theorem on incorporating IIAS into
PDAL. The proof is similar to that of (3) and can be found
in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 4. Let (xt, yt) be generated by PDAL for the
3To align the primal and dual iterates in the increasing averag-
ing version of PDAL, yt here corresponds to yt+1 in the original
paper, for all t ≥ 0.
saddle point problem (4) with f = 0. Let wt be as follows:{
w0 = 0, w1 = 1,
wt+1 = wt ·min
{
1+θt
θt+1
, (t+1)
q
tq
}
, t ≥ 1. (15)
Define ST :=
∑T
t=1 wtτt and
x¯T =
w1θ1τ1x0 +
∑N
t=1 wtτtx˜
t
wtτ1θ1 + ST
, y¯T =
∑T
t=1 wtτty
t
ST
.
For any (x, y) ∈ X× Y, it holds that, for all T ≥ 2,
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤
wT
(
ΩX +
1
βΩY
)
+ w1τ1θ1P0
ST
(16)
where P0 = g(x0)− g(x) + 〈K∗yˆ, x0 − x〉.
Similar to the proof of Corollary 1, we can easily deduce
the rate of convergence of the increasing averages.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4, for any
T ≥ 1, and any (x, y) ∈ X× Y, one has
L(x¯T , y)− L(x, y¯T ) ≤
(q + 1)
(
ΩX +
1
βΩY + τ1θ1P0
)
T
.
4. Mirror-type algorithms
A similar extension can also be applied to another class of
algorithms for saddle-point problems, namely, Mirror De-
scent (MD) (Nemirovski & Yudin, 1983; Beck & Teboulle,
2003) and Mirror Prox (MP) (Nemirovski, 2004). These
algorithms require a setup slightly different from that of
Section 2.
Problem setup and notation In addition to the setup of
Section 2, further assume that X and Y are Euclidean spaces.
Let Z = X× Y and ‖ · ‖ be be any norm (with dual norm
‖ · ‖∗) on the product space Z. Let X ⊆ X and Y ⊆ Y
be closed convex sets. Let φ : Z = X × Y → R be a
convex-concave cost function, that is, φ(·, y) is convex for
any y ∈ Y and φ(x, ·) is concave for any x ∈ X . The
saddle-point problem of interest is
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
φ(x, y). (17)
Let ψZ : Z → R be a 1-strongly convex (w.r.t. ‖ ·
‖Z) smooth function, that is, a DGF on Z.4 Let the
Bregman divergence function DZ be defined as (3) with
V = Z. Let Ω = supz∈Z DZ(z) be an upper bound on
4For example, given DGF ψX(x) and ψY for X and Y, the DGF
ψZ(z) := ψX(x) + ψY(y), z = (x, y), is 1-strongly convex w.r.t.
the norm ‖z‖ := √‖x‖2X + ‖y‖2Y.
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Algorithm 5 Mirror Descent (MD) and Mirror Prox (MP)
Input: initial iterate z0 = (x0, y0) ∈ Z, stepsizes τt.
Iterations: For t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , compute
MD: zt+1 = ProxZ〈τtF (zt),·〉(z
t)
MP:
{
z˜t = ProxZ〈τtF (zt),·〉(z
t)
zt+1 = ProxZ〈τtF (z˜t),·〉(z
t)
the DGF on Z .5 The “gradient vector field” associated
with (17) is F (z) =
(
∂
∂x
φ(z),− ∂∂y φ(z)
)
. We assume
F is bounded and L-Lipschitz continuous on Z, that is,
MF = supz∈Z ‖F (z)‖∗ < ∞ and ‖F (x) − F (z′)‖∗ ≤
L‖z − z′‖ for any z, z′ ∈ Z . For z, ξ ∈ Z, define the
(constrained) proximal mapping (of a linear function) as
ProxZ〈ξ,·〉(z) := arg minw∈Z {〈ξ, w〉+DZ(w, z)}. The al-
gorithms are listed together here as Algorithm 5.
Similar to the PDA algorithms, we show that MP works
with IIAS6.
Theorem 5. Let z˜t = (x˜t, y˜t) be generated by MP and
define the error term
δt := τt〈F (z˜t), z˜t − zt+1〉 −DZ(zt+1, zt).
Let the weights wt be nonnegative and nondecreasing. De-
fine7
ST =
T∑
t=1
wtτt, z¯
T = (x¯T , y¯T ) =
∑T
t=1 wtτtz˜
t
ST
.
Then, for any T ≥ 1 and any (x, y) ∈ X× Y, it holds that
φ(x¯T , y)− φ(x, y¯T ) ≤ wTΩ +
∑T
t=1 wtδt
ST
. (18)
In particular, using constant stepsizes τt = 1L and wt = t
q ,
q ≥ 0, we have δt ≤ 0 and
φ(x¯T , y)− φ(x, y¯T ) ≤ (q + 1)LΩ
T
. (19)
The proof can be found in Appendix A.5. In addition, Ben-
Tal & Nemirovski (2019) show that a similar bound holds
for MD with increasing averaging (See Theorem 5.3.5 in
their notes).
5Ω here in fact corresponds to the constant Θ in (Ben-Tal &
Nemirovski, 2019), defined on page 356. There, instead, Ω :=
supz,z′∈Z ψZ(z, z
′) is the upper bound on the DGF.
6During the course of this research, we found that IIAS for MP
has already been analyzed in the growing lecture notes of Ben-Tal
& Nemirovski (2019). Specifically, Theorem 5.6.2 in (Ben-Tal &
Nemirovski, 2019) presents the weighted averaging version of MP,
though no explicit formulas for weights are given.
7Note the stepsizes in the definition of ST and z¯T .
5. Numerical experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the numerical speedup of
increasing averaging schemes for matrix games, extensive-
form games, Fisher-market-competitive-equilibrium com-
putation, and image-denoising problems. For matrix games
and EFG, our best first-order methods are compared against
state-of-the-art methods for equilibrium computation.
Matrix games Here, we describe the setups at a high level;
Further details can be found in Appendix B.1. A matrix
game can be formulated as a simple bilinear saddle-point
problem minx∈∆n1 maxy∈∆n2 〈x,Ay〉, where ∆k := {x ∈
Rk | x>e = 1, x ≥ 0} is the unit simplex in Rk. To use
PDA, RPDA, IPDA, or PDAL to solve a matrix game, we
take f , g∗ to be the indicator functions of ∆n1 , ∆n2 and
K = A>. For MP, we take X = ∆n1 and Y = ∆n2 and
φ(x, y) = 〈x,Ay〉. We also try a linesearch variant of MP,
referred to as MPL, that performs linesearch following the
description on page 443 of (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2019).
For all algorithms, we use their “default” stepsize settings
and Euclidean DGF. We generate matrix games of different
sizes with i.i.d. entries and solve them using all six algo-
rithms. For each matrix game and each algorithm, we per-
form T = 2000 iterations, take increasing averages of the
iterates and compute their saddle-point residuals. Residuals
are normalized to make then commensurable in magnitude.
The above is repeated 50 times, and we plot the averages and
standard deviations of the normalized residuals along sam-
ple paths of each setup-algorithm-averaging combination.
Figure 1 displays the resulting plots of residual averages
together with standard deviations. IIAS leads to significant
performance improvement for all algorithms across all ex-
periment setups, both against uniform averages as expected,
but, perhaps surprisingly, also against the last iterates.
Next, we compare PDA, RPDA, and CFR+ on the same set
of random matrix games as well as on a 2× 2 matrix game
with payoff matrix A =
[
5 −1
0 1
]
(Farina et al., 2019). Fig-
ure 2 displays the results for these experiments: the upper
plot is for the random matrix game experiments and displays
averaged, normalized residuals and standard deviations of 3
setups, similar to Figure 1; the lower plot is for the 2×2 ma-
trix game and displays the (unnormalized) residual values.
Clearly, PDA and RPDA outperform CFR+ in both settings.
Moreover, for the 2× 2 matrix game, the last iterates con-
verge rapidly, suggesting the use of a large weight exponent
q. As the lower subplot in Figure 2 displays, using q = 10
in the averaging can even outperform the rapidly converging
last iterates.
Extensive-form games An EFG can be written as a bilin-
ear saddle-point problem (BLSP) minx∈X maxy∈Y 〈x,Ay〉
where X ⊆ Rn1 and Y ⊆ Rn2 are polytopes encoding play-
ers’ strategy spaces, known as treeplexes (Hoda et al., 2010).
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We perform IIAS with uniform, linear, quadratic and cubic
averaging for all first-order methods on two classic EFG
benchmark instances Kuhn and Leduc poker. The choices
of the algorithms’ hyperparameters are completely analo-
gous to those in solving matrix games and is described in
Appendix B.1. As Figure 3 shows, increasing averages out-
perform uniform averages for all algorithms in both games.
For all algorithms except MP, increasing averages also con-
verge faster than the last iterate, especially in later iterations.
For both games, we also compare RPDA with quadratic and
q = 10 averaging, CFR+ (Tammelin et al., 2015) and EGT
with the dilated entropy DGF (Kroer et al., 2018b). We
plot the saddle-point residuals against number of gradient
computations x 7→ A>x and y 7→ Ay, since EGT uses
linesearch and requires a varying number of gradient com-
putations in each iteration.8 As Figure 4 shows, RPDA with
quadratic and q = 10 averaging significantly outperforms
CFR+ and EGT on Kuhn but are not as fast as CFR+ on
Leduc. RPDA with quadratic averaging and using theoreti-
cally safe, highly conservative stepsizes outperforms EGT,
which employs sophisticated, unsafe, adaptive stepsizing.
Competitive equilibrium In a Fisher market, each buyer
i has a valuation vector vi ∈ Rm+ over m goods. An al-
location vector xi ∈ Rm+ gives a utility of v>i xi to buyer
i. Each buyer i has budget Bi and each good j has supply
sj . A competitive equilibirum is a vector of prices p ∈ Rm
for the goods and an allocation x = [x1, . . . , xn] ∈ Rn×m
such that xi ∈ arg max
{
v>i xi | p>xi ≤ Bi
}
for all buy-
ers and
∑
i xij = sj for all j. To compute a competitive
equilibirum, it suffices to solve the Eisenberg-Gale convex
program (Eisenberg & Gale, 1959; Jain & Vazirani, 2010),
which has a saddle-point formulation (Kroer et al., 2019):
min
p≥0
n∑
i=1
max
xi≥0
[
Bi log(v
>
i xi)− p>xi
]
+ s>p. (20)
Problem (20) can be reformulated into (4). We generate ran-
dom instances of different sizes, solve them using PDA and
compute the saddle-point residuals of the last iterates and
various averages. The details of problem reformulation and
random instance generation are deferred into Appendix B.2.
Repeat each experiment 50 times, normalize residuals and
compute mean and standard deviations similar to the pro-
cedures in matrix games. Figure 5 displays the normalized
residuals. Here, the standard deviations have small mag-
nitudes compared to the averaged values and thus become
invisible in the plot. Clearly, as Figure 5 shows, increasing
averages can converge as fast as, and even more rapidly
(q = 5 averaging in the rightmost subplot) than the last
iterates.
8Since we are interested in the regime where gradient computa-
tions dominant the overall computation cost, we assume computing
the proximal mappings under different DGF takes much less time
in comparison.
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Figure 1. First-order methods with IIAS on random matrix games
Image denoising via TV-`1 minimization The Total Vari-
ation (TV)-`1 model is a means for image denoising through
convex optimization (Chambolle & Pock, 2011). Here we
describe briefly the saddle-point formulation of the convex
optimization problem, following the setup of Chambolle &
Pock (2011) (see page 132 therein for more details). Let
X = Rm×n be the image domain. Let div denote the diver-
gence operator, that is, is the negative adjoint of the gradient
operator ∇ : X → X. Let Y = X × X = Rm,n,2 be
the set of discrete finite differences. Let P = {p ∈ Y |
(p1ij)
2 + (p2ij)
2 ≤ 1} be the point-wise unit `2-ball. The
saddle-point formulation of the TV-`1 model is
min
u∈X
max
p∈Y
−〈u, div p〉+ λ‖u− g‖1 − δP (p), (21)
where λ > 0 is the regularization strength hyperparameter.
Following Chambolle & Pock (2011), to align (21) with
(4), we choose f = 0, g(u) = λ‖u − g‖1 with λ = 1.5
Increasing Iterate Averaging for Solving Saddle-Point Problems
100 101 102 103
10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10 1
100
Uniform 100-by-100
100 101 102 103
10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10 1
100
Normal 100-by-100
100 101 102 103
10 5
10 4
10 3
10 2
10 1
100
Normal 100-by-300
iteration
sc
al
ed
 sa
dd
le
-p
oi
nt
 re
sid
ua
l
PDA quadratic
RPDA quadratic
CFR+
100 101 102
iteration
10 12
10 10
10 8
10 6
10 4
10 2
100
sa
dd
le
 p
oi
nt
 re
sid
ua
l
PDA v.s. RPDA v.s. CFR+ on a 2-by-2 matrix game
cfr+
PDA q=2 (quadratic)
RPDA q=2 (quadratic)
PDA q=10
RPDA q=10
PDA last iter
RPDA last iter
Figure 2. PDA and RPDA with IIAS v.s. CFR+ for matrix games
10 3
10 2
10 1
100
PDA RPDA IPDA
100 101 102 103
10 3
10 2
10 1
100
PDAL
100 101 102 103
MP
100 101 102 103
MPL
iteration
sa
dd
le
-p
oi
nt
 re
sid
ua
l
FOM with increasing averaging for Leduc last
uniform
linear
quadratic
cubic
10 5
10 3
10 1
PDA RPDA IPDA
100 101 102
10 5
10 3
10 1
PDAL
100 101 102
MP
100 101 102
MPL
iteration
sa
dd
le
-p
oi
nt
 re
sid
ua
l
FOM with increasing averaging for Kuhn last
uniform
linear
quadratic
cubic
Figure 3. First-order methods with IIAS for EFG
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Figure 5. PDA with IIAS for Fisher market competitive equilib-
rium computation
and h∗(p) = δP (p); in this way, the proximal mappings
have closed-form expressions involving the Shrinkage oper-
ator and projection onto the unit `∞-ball (see page 135-136
therein). We add salt-and-pepper noise to three 256× 256-
gray-scale images to obtain corrupted input images and use
the TV-`1 minimization procedure for reconstruction. To
solve the resulting saddle-point problems, we use PDA with
default, static hyperparameters used in (Chambolle & Pock,
2011) and run for T = 1000 iterations. We compute the
values of the original primal TV-`1 loss values of the last
iterates and the various increasing averages. The loss values
are normalized similar to the matrix game experiments and
are displayed in Figure 6. Here, the last iterates converge
fast, while linear and quadratic averages still perform nearly
as well, and are far ahead of uniform averages. See Ap-
pendix B.3 for the original, corrputed, and reconstructed
images, where the reconstruction is via PDA with quadratic
averaging.
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Figure 6. PDA with IIAS for TV-`1 minimization
6. Conclusion
We proposed increasing iterate averaging schemes for var-
ious first-order methods, provided simple, implementable
choices of averaging weights and established convergence
properties of the new iterate averages. Extensive numerical
experiments on various saddle-point problems demonstrated
their ability to accelerate numerical convergence by orders
of magnitude without modifying the original algorithm or in-
curring extra computation. We reiterate that the algorithms
are run unaltered with untuned, theoretically safe hyperpa-
rameters, while the averaging weights are chosen simply
based on their respective convergence theorems. Even so,
IIAS can bring the algorithms close to, and sometimes make
them beat, other carefully engineered and tuned competitors.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 2
By the proof of Theorem 2 in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016), under the said assumptions, for any z = (x, y) ∈ X× Y and all
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , the following critical inequality holds:
L(ξt+1, y)− L(x, ηt+1) ≤ 1
2ρt
(At −At+1), (22)
where At := 12‖z − zt‖2Mτ,σ . Note that
At =
1
2τ
‖x− xt‖2 + 1
2σ
‖y − tt‖2 − 〈K(x− xt), y − yt〉 ≤ 1
τ
ΩX +
1
σ
ΩY + ‖K‖ = Ω. (23)
Subsequently, similar to the proof of Theorem 1, the following telescoping sum bound holds:
T∑
t=1
wt
(L(ξt, y)− L(x, ηt)) ≤ 1
2
T∑
t=1
(
wt
ρt−1
− wt−1
ρt−2
)
At−1 ≤ 1
2
T∑
t=1
wt − wt−1
ρt−1
At−1 ≤ Ω
2ρ0
wT , (24)
where the first inequality is the weighted sum of (22) by wt+1 over t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1 and the second is due to
0 < ρt−2 ≤ ρt−1. Equation (11) then follows in the same way as in Theorem 1.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we prove the following algebraic lemma.
Lemma 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3, for all t ≥ 1, we have
1− αt−1 − wt+1
wt
αt ≥ 0, (25)(
1
τ
− 1 + αt−1 +
wt+1
wt
(αt + α
2
t )
1− αt−1 − 2wt+1wt αt
)
1
σ
≥ ‖K‖2. (26)
In other words, the matrix Mt :=
( 1τ − 1+αt−1+(αt+α2t )wt+1wt1−αt−2wt+1wt αt Lf
)
I −K∗
−K 1σ I
 is positive semidefinite for all t.
Proof. For any t, bt ≤ 1−αt−1αt clearly implies (25). Furthermore, bt ≤
r(1−αt−1)−(1+αt−1)
αt(1+2r+αt)
implies, via simple rearranging,
`(bt) :=
1 + αt−1 + bt(αt + α2t )
1− (αt + 2btαt) ≤ r =
1
τ − σ‖K‖2
Lf
.
Note that `(·) is monotone increasing on
[
1, 1−αt2αt
]
. Therefore, the choice of wt ensures that
wt+1
wt
≤ bt, which implies
`(wt+1wt ) ≤ `(bt) ≤
1
τ−σ‖K‖2
Lf
. This is just (26) rearranged.
We then prove the theorem. First, we show that wt is monotone. Clearly,
1−αt−1
αt
≥ 2 by the choice of αt. Since
r(1− αt−1)− (1 + αt−1)
αt(1 + 2r + αt)
≥ 1⇔ (12),
we have bt ≥ 1 and hence wt+1 ≥ wt.
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Define z−1 = z0. For n ≥ 0, denote At = 12‖z − zt‖2Mτ,σ , Bt = 12‖zt − zt−1‖2Mτ,σ and Ct = 12‖xt − xt−1‖2. Note that
B0 = C0 = 0 and A−1 = A0. By the proof of Theorem 3 in (Chambolle & Pock, 2016), the following critical inequality
holds for any t ≥ 0 and any z = (x, y) ∈ X× Y:
L(xt+1, y)− L(x, yt+1)
≤ (At −At+1) + αt(At −At−1) + (αt − 1)Bt+1 + 2αtBt + Lf
(
(1 + αt)Ct+1 + (αt + α
2
t )Ct
)
. (27)
Multiplying (27) by wt+1, summing over t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and rearranging the right hand side yield
T∑
t=1
wt(L(xt, y)− L(x, yt))
≤
T−1∑
t=1
(wt+1 − wt)At + (w1A0 − wTAT )
+
N−2∑
t=0
(αtwt+1 − αt+1wt+2)At + (−α0w1A−1 + αT−1wTAT−1)
+
N−1∑
t=1
[
((αt−1 − 1)wt + 2αtwt+1)Bt + Lf
(
(1 + αt−1)wt + (αt + α2t )wt+1
)
Ct
]
+ (αT−1 − 1)wTBT + 2α0w1B0 + Lf
[
(1 + αT−1)wTCT + (α0 + α20)w1C0
]
. (28)
Then, we simplify and bound the summation terms and “leftover” terms separately. First, recall that α0w1B0 = 0 and
(α0 + α
2
0)w1C1 = 0. Since At ≤ Ω for all t, we have
T−1∑
t=1
(wt+1 − wt)At +
N−2∑
t=1
(αtwt+1 − αt+1wt+2)At ≤ Ω [(1− αT−1)wT + α1w2 − w1] . (29)
Meanwhile, straightforward computation verifies that
N−1∑
t=1
[
((αt−1 − 1)wt + 2αtwt+1)Bt + Lf
(
(1 + αt−1)wt + (αt + α2t )wt+1
)
Ct
]
= −
T−1∑
t=1
wt
(
1− αt−1 − 2wt+1
wt
αt
)
‖zt − zt−1‖2Mt ≤ 0, (30)
where the last inequality is due to (25) and (26) in Lemma 2.
Using the inequality |〈a, b〉| ≤ ‖a‖2+‖b‖22 , we have 12AT−1 ≤ AT +BT . Therefore,
αT−1wTAT−1 − wTAT + (αT−1 − 1)wTBT + Lf (1 + αT−1)wTCT
≤ wT [(2αT−1 − 1)AT + (3αT−1 − 1)BT + Lf (αT−1 + 1)CT ] ≤ 0, (31)
where the last inequality follows from 2αT−1−12 < 0 and
(3αT−1 − 1)BT + Lf (αT−1 + 1)CT = −(1− 3αT−1)‖z − zT ‖P ≤ 0,
where P :=
[
( 1τ − 1+αT−11−3αT−1Lf )I −K∗
−K 1σ I
]
is positive definite since αT−1 ≤ α < 1/3.
Now, the only “untreated” terms on the right hand side of (28) are w1A0 and −α0w1A−1 = −α0w1A0. Combining (28),
(29), (30) and (31), we have
T∑
t=1
wt(L(xt, y)− L(x, yt)) ≤ (1− α0)w1A0 + Ω [(1− αT−1)wT + α1w2 − w1] .
The desired equation (14) then follows from the convex-concave structure of L.
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A.3. Proof of Corollary 1
Since the numerator of the right hand side of (14) can be bounded by (1− α0)Ω + ΩwT ≤ (2−Ω)wT , it suffices to bound
wT
ST
. By the choice of wt, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, one has 1 ≤ wTwt ≤
(t+1)q
tq · · · T
q
(T−1)q =
T q
tq . Therefore,
wT
ST
=
1∑T
t=1
wt
wT
≤ 1∑T
t=1
tq
T q
=
T q∑T
t=1 t
q
≤ q + 1
T
.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 4
For any (x′, y′) ∈ X× Y, denote
P (x′) = g(x′)− g(x) + 〈K∗y, x′ − x〉,
D(y′) = h∗(y′)− h∗(y)− 〈Kx, y′ − y〉.
Note that P (·) andD(·) are both convex. DenoteEt = 12 (‖xt−x‖2+ 1β ‖yt−1−y‖2), which clearly satisfiesEt ≤ ΩX+ 1βΩY
by assumption. By the proof of Theorem 3.4 in (Malitsky & Pock, 2018), the following critical inequality hold for any t ≥ 1
and any (x, y) ∈ X× Y:9
τt
[
(1 + θt)P (x
t)− θtP (xt−1) +D(yt)
] ≤ Et − Et+1. (32)
Multiplying both sides by wt and summing up over t = 1, . . . , T yield
A+B ≤
T∑
t=1
wt(Et − Et+1) ≤
T∑
t=1
(wt − wt−1)Et ≤
(
ΩX +
1
β
ΩY
)
, (33)
where
A =
T∑
t=1
wtτt
[
(1 + θt)P (x
t)− θtP (xt−1)
]
= −w1τ − tθtP (x0) + wT τT (1 + θT )P (xT ) +
T∑
t=2
[(1 + θt−1)wt−1τt−1 − θtwtτt]P (xt−1),
B =
T∑
t=1
wtτtD(y
t).
By the algorithm, θt = τtτt−1 . By the choice of wt, we have
wt
wt−1
≤ 1+θt−1
θ2t
. Therefore, it holds that
(1 + θt−1)wt−1τt−1 ≥ θ2twtτt−1 ≥ θtwtτt. (34)
By the definition of x˜t and rearrangement of terms, it holds that
wT τT (1 + θT ) +
T∑
t=2
[(1 + θt−1)wt−1τt−1 − θtwtτt] = w1τ1θ1 + ST
wT τT (1 + θT )x
T +
T∑
t=2
[(1 + θt−1)wt−1τt−1 − θtwtτt]xT−1 = w1θ1τ1x0 +
T∑
t=1
wtτtx˜
t = x¯T .
By (34), convexity of P (·) and the above identities, one has
A ≥
(
w1τ1θ1 +
T∑
t=2
wtτt
)
P (x¯T )− w1τ1θ1P (x0) ≥ STP (x¯T )− w1τ1θ1P (x0). (35)
9Malitsky & Pock (2018) assumes (x, y) is a saddle point of (4) (with f = 0). However, the statement and proof of their Theorem 3.5
in fact hold for general (x, y).
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Meanwhile, convexity of D(·) implies
B ≥ STD(y¯T ). (36)
Finally, substituting (35) and (36) into (33) gives the desired inequality (16).
A.5. Proof of Theorem 5
We only need to prove (19), since the rest of the theorem is Theorem 5.6.1 in (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2019). By this
theorem, τt = 1/T implies δt ≤ 0. Therefore, the right hand side of 18 reduces to wTΩST . By the choice of wt, we have
wT
ST
= LT
q∑T
t=1 t
q ≤ (q+1)LT , where the last inequality is the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Further details on numerical experiments
B.1. Matrix game and extensive-form game experiments
Random matrix generation For random matrix games, matrices have i.i.d. entries distributed as either 12U(0, 1) − 1
(“uniform”) or N (0, 1) (”normal”), where U(0, 1) is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and N (0, 1) is the standard normal
distribution. We generate 100 × 100-uniform, 100 × 100-normal and 100 × 300-normal random matrices, as shown in
Figure 1.
Algorithm hyperparameters For both random matrix games and EFG, the hyperparameters of the algorithms are set as
follows. for PDA, RPDA, IPDA, τ =
√
1−1/n2
1−1/n1α, σ =
√
1−1/n1
1−1/n2α, where α = 0.99/L and L is the oeprator norm of
K = A>. for RPDA, the relaxation parameter is fixed at ρt = ρ = 1.5; for IPDA, set αt = α = 0.3; for PDAL, set µ = 0.2,
δ = 0.8 and β = 1 throughout (Malitsky & Pock, 2018). For MP, τt = τ = 1/L. For MPL, using the notation on page 443
of (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2019), further set the aggressive stepsizing multipliers to θ+ = 1.2, θ− = 0.8, and τsafe = 1/L
(we use τ for stepsize, which is γ therein).
For IPDA, sice f = 0, we have Lf = 0. Therefore, by the choice of bt in Theorem 3, we can take bt = 1−α2α = 7/6. Then,
we choose wt according to the recursive formula 13. Note that this does not affect the eventual polynomial growth of wt.
For example, for quadratic averaging, since (16/15)2 < 7/6, we have wt+1wt =
(t+1)2
t2 for all t ≥ 15. For PDAL, the weights
are chosen according to (15) for all values of q. Note that they are nondecreasing but do not necessarily grow polynomially
eventually.
Normalizing the saddle-point residuals It turns out that the generated matrix games can have varied difficulty - some are
much easier to solve (that is, to get a solution with very low saddle-point residual) than others. Therefore, we normalize the
saddle-point residuals across different matrix games as follows. For each generated matrix game and each algorithm, let the
computed saddle-point residuals of the increasing averages be q1, . . . , 
q
T (also compute them for the last iterates, “q = last”).
in order to make the sample paths comparable, we normalize each residual qt to
qt−∗
∗ , where ∗ := 0.5 ·minq,t qt and
∗ = maxq 
q
1. In this way, we are comparing the relative performance of different algorithms with different averaging
schemes.
For the game Kuhn, each algorithm is run for T = 100 iterations; for Leduc, each algirhtm is run for T = 2000 iterations.
B.2. Details of the competitive equilibrium computation experiments
Reformulation of (20) into (4) The reformulation here is based on (Kroer et al., 2019). They show that, in equilibrium,
each buyer i is guaranteed at least their proportional allocation under any feasible set of prices. Therefore, for each buyer
i, there exists a proportional shares γi > 0 such that v>i xi ≥ γi under equilibrium. Denote the resulting set of allocation
vectors for buyer i as Ui = {u ∈ Rm | v>i u ≥ γi, u ≥ 0} and denote the indicator function of a set C as δC ∈ {0,∞}.
Then, the saddle-point problem (20) is equivalent to
min
p≥0
[
n∑
i=1
max
xi∈Ui
(
Bi log(v
>
i xi)− p>xi
)
+ s>p
]
.
Note that we can impose upper bounds on both x and p without affecting the equilibrium. in fact, any equilibrium solution
must satisfy 0 ≤ xi ≤ s and 0 ≤ p ≤ p¯ for some p¯ > 0 (Kroer et al., 2019). Therefore, by Sion’s minmax theorem, we can
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interchange min and max:
max
xi∈Ui
min
p≥0
[
n∑
i=1
(
Bi log(v
>
i xi)− p>xi
)
+ s>p
]
.
To align with (4), simply negating the signs:
min
xi∈Ui
max
p≥0
[
−
n∑
i=1
(
Bi log(v
>
i xi)− p>xi
)− s>p] ,
where we set f(x) = −∑ni=1Bi log(v>i xi), g(x) = ∑i δUi(xi), h∗(p) = −s>p, and K to be the matrix encoding
(x, p) 7→∑i p>xi. Here, indeed, f is convex and smooth, whose Lipschitz constant can be bounded by√n+ maxi,j vij Biγi
(Kroer et al., 2019). We then use PDA to solve the reformulated problem.
Random instance generation We generate 3 types of random instances: (n,m) = (20, 20) with i.i.d. U(0, 1) valuations,
(20, 20) with i.i.d. truncated normal valuations, and (40, 20) with i.i.d. truncated normal (µ = 5, σ2 = 4 truncated into
[0, 10]) valuations.
B.3. Details of the TV-`1 minimization experiments
Figure 7 displays the original, corrupted, and reconstructed images - Cameraman, Pirates and Bingley. The reconstruction is
based on the quadratic averages of the PDA iterates at T = 1000.
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Figure 7. Original (left), corrupted (middle) and reconstructed images (right) of Cameraman (top), Pirate (middle), and Bingley (bottom)
